Risk and Information Processing by Rasmussen, J.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
General rights 
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners 
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal  
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
   
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Dec 19, 2017
Risk and Information Processing
Rasmussen, Jørgen
Publication date:
1985
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link back to DTU Orbit
Citation (APA):
Rasmussen, J. (1985). Risk and Information Processing.  (Risø-M; No. 2518).
RISØ-M-2518 
RISK AND INFORMATION PROCESSING 
J e n s Rasmussen 
A b s t r a c t . The r e a s o n s f o r t he c u r r e n t w idesp read a rgument s b e -
tween d e s i g n e r s of a d v a n c e d t e c h n o l o g i c a l s y s t e m s l i k e , f o r 
i n s t a n c e , n u c l e a r power p l a n t s and o p p o n e n t s from t h e g e n e r a l 
p u b l i c c o n c e r n i n g l e v e l s of a c c e p t a b l e r i s k may be found i n 
i n c o m p a t i b l e d e f i n i t i o n s of r i s k , i n d i f f e r e n c e s i n r i s k p e r c e p -
t i o n and c r i t e r i a f o r a c c e p t a n c e , e t c . Of i m p o r t a n c e may, how-
e v e r , a l s o be t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s met i n p r e s e n t i n g t h e b a s i s f o r 
r i s k a n a l y s i s , such as t he concep tua l sys tem models a p p l i e d , in 
an e x p l i c i t and c r e d i b l e form. A p p l i c a t i o n of modern i n f o r m a t i o n 
technology for- the des ign of c o n t r o l sy s t ems and human-machine 
i n t e r f a c e s t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e t r e n d s t o w a r d s l a r g e c e n t r a l i s e d 
i n d u s t r i a l i n s t a l l a t i o n s have made i t i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o 
e s t a b l i s h an a c c e p t a b l e model f r a m e w o r k , i n p a r t i c u l a r c o n -
s i d e r i n g the r o l e of human e r r o r s i n major system f a i l u r e s and 
a c c i d e n t s . D i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s of t h i s p r o b l e m a r e d i s c u s s e d i n 
t he pape r , and a r e a s a r e i d e n t i f i e d where r e s e a r c h i s needed in 
o r d e r t o i m p r o v e n o t o n l y t h e s a f e t y of a d v a n c e d s y s t e m s , b u t 
a l s o the b a s i s for t h e i r a c c e p t a n c e by the g e n e r a l p u b l i c . 
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INTRODUCTION 
Two trends in the industr ia l and technological development have 
had major impacts on the problems in coping with the r i sk i n -
volved in industr ia l operations. F i rs t of a l l , there has been a 
general trend towards large and central ised operations, not only 
in production p lan t s but a lso in a d m i n i s t r a t i v e systems, com-
mercial companies and outlet chains, with the consequence that 
faul ts and errors can lead to drast ic damage and economic loss. 
Examples from recent years are l eg io . This s i t u a t i o n has im-
mediately two consequences in the present context. On one hand, 
during system design i t i s now becoming necessary to consider 
the consequences of events and condi t ions of very low prob-
a b i l i t y . On the o ther , due to the short time span between con-
c e p t u a l i s a t i o n of new products or processes and f u l l - s c a l e 
operation, th is cannot be done from direct empirical evidence or 
operation of prototype systems. During periods of rapid develop-
ment and with changes of basic t echnologies , piecemeal ad-
justment of p r i o r designs i s no longer adequate. Ins tead , new 
a n a l y t i c a l methods have to be found, and a "top-down" design 
approach based on proper predictive models i s necessary. Such a 
design approach has to include a consideration of the ultimate 
r isk related to operation by means of systematic analyt ical risk 
assessment. 
This i n d u s t r i a l development has led to a widespread publ ic 
concern with the safety of such ins t a l l a t ions , and the designers 
have made ser ious a t tempts to explain and document the safe ty 
t a r g e t s underlying the design and the p r o b a b i l i s t i c cons ider -
ations by which the design i s validated. Such attempts have had 
l imi t ed success , with the consequence tha t the d i f ference be-
tween objective risk concepts of system designers and the sub-
j e c t i v e r i sk percept ion of the general publ ic has been widely 
studied and discussed. Based on the assumption that quanti tat ive 
risk figures are not understood by the general public, designers 
have made g rea t , but l a rge ly unsuccessful a t t empts to compare 
the i r risk figures with other categories of natural and man-made 
r i s k s , and many a t tempts have been made to expla in the lack of 
accept, in terms of di f ference in r i sk acceptance depending on 
the degree of voluntary exposure, in acceptance of individual or 
c o l l e c t i v e r i s k , e t c . This approach in turn being based on the 
assumption tha t a kind of more or l e s s conscious r i s k evalu-
ation is underlying the different personal choices. 
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This argumentation may be misleading in two respects. Fi rs t of 
a l l , the lack of accept of the r i sk f igures r e s u l t i n g from 
quanti tat ive risk assessment may not only be related to accept-
ance of the r i sk leve l per' se , but a lso to a lack of confidence 
in the underlying assumptions of the a n a l y s i s . Secondly, the 
concept of r i sk cannot be separated from other aspects of per -
sonal value judgements underlying in tu i t ive human choice. 
In the following s e c t i o n s , i t i s argued tha t the present rapid 
development of information technology may increase the d i f f i -
cu l ty in formulat ing a c red ib le bas i s for r i sk ana lys i s and 
point to areas where basic research i s needed in order to im-
prove the model framework behind risk analysis. 
TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS 
Analysis of niajor acc idents has inva r i ab ly shown tha t human 
a c t i v i t i e s have been involved in the causat ion and fur ther 
development of the course of events . Reviews show tha t human 
errors have been significant in typically 70 to 80% of accidents 
reported. Coping with the human role i s c lear ly important, but 
the new technology i s presenting special problems since analy t i -
cal assessment requires predictive models of human performance, 
models which are not presently well developed. 
Another important Industr ial trend is the introduction of modern 
information technology in the interface between humans and the i r 
actual work content. Information technology will now allow, both 
technically and economically, the design of very complex control 
systems. This means tha t a l l frequent and, the re fore , well 
formulated tasks are l i ke ly to be automated. Left to the human 
supervisor are the more c r ea t i ve tasks r e l a t e d to problem 
solving. In consequence, system design cannot be based on the 
t r a d i t i o n a l ana ly s i s and desc r ip t ion of t a sks and funct ions . 
Instead, design should be in terms of an envelope within which 
an opera tor can adopt e f fec t ive s t r a t e g i e s during s i t u a t i o n s 
which have only been foreseen by the designer in kind, not in 
par t icular . Modern computers and information displays are effec-
tive means for system designers in the i r attempts to match the 
selection and presentation of information to the various human 
tasks and r o l e s . This op t imisa t ion cannot be based on t r a -
dit ional task analysis in terms of action on the system, but an 
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analysis in terms of cognitive or mental ac t iv i ty i s necessary. 
Misconception in th i s aspect of design may leave the human in a 
s i t u a t i o n which i s worse than i t would be by l e s s advanced 
technology. In consequence, methods for a n a l y t i c a l r i sk a s -
sessment including the human ac t i v i t i e s in system operation and 
maintenance become for design of large-scale industr ia l i n s t a l -
l a t i ons. 
OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE RISK 
The basic r i s k concept involved in the ob jec t ive eva lua t ions 
applied by design .-s and in the sub jec t ive judgements of the 
general public i s in both cases related to an aggregated measure 
of p robab i l i t y and magnitude of negat ive e f f e c t s . The ac tua l 
decis ion processes are .however, b a s i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t . The 
evaluat ion performed by des igners i s based on a conscious, 
analytical comparison cf quanti tat ive measures of separate as-
pec ts of cos t s and bene f i t s , such as product ive output and 
losses caused by disturbances. 
Most human choice i s not, however, based on such r a t i o n a l 
analysis which is mainly typical of formal professional a c t i v i -
t i e s , but en ho l i s t i c , in tu i t ive and mostly subconscious judge-
ments. Risk w i l l be only one fea ture of the value percept ion 
underlying in tu i t ive choices, and wil l not be considered separ-
a t e l y , except maybe for a f t e r - t h e - f a c t explana t ion . From r e -
search on soc ia l judgement i t i s wellknown tha t judges use 
fewer, and frequently different cues than they can ra t ional i se 
when asked. The context in v/hich r i sk may inf luence judgement 
wil l vary v/idely with the par t icular se t t ing . In general public 
acceptance of new technologies, such as, for instance, nuclear 
energy or genet ic engineer ing, value judgements a lso involve 
features of general po l i t i ca l nature and emotional reactions to 
unknown technologies . In quest ions whether to choose l i v i n g 
c lose to such i n s t a l l a t i o n s , f ea tu res of immediate qua l i t y of 
l i f e aspects i n t e r f e r e . When en te r ing a c t i v i t i e s l ike sk i ing , 
mountain climbing, or high speed driving, r isk perception prob-
ably has much less weight in judgements than the immediate feed-
back from perception of the l imi t s of control which i s necessary 
for improvement of s k i l l , together with) the joy experienced from 
such s k i l l improvement. Considering choice of the ind iv idua l 
acts of an ac t iv i ty , risk considerations may be involved during 
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conscious preplanning, but when once absorbed in the performance 
of a s k i l l e d task , our ana lys i s of accident repor t s and verbal 
p ro toco ls i n d i c a t e s a c t i v i t y to be con t ro l l ed by immediate 
functional c r i t e r i a l ike "choosing the way of least effort" and 
control by higher leve l f ea tu res l i ke r i sk p o t e n t i a l appears 
less l ikely. 
The ro le of r i s k fea tu res in a judgement, t he re fo re , cannot be 
separated from the context by objective analysis, and ra t ional 
arguments based on comparison of the perception of r isk across 
a c t i v i t i e s and s i tuat ions cannot be expected to change people's 
actual judgements. 
An important reason for the lack of acceptance of risk in spi te 
of the ob jec t ive ly acceptable q u a n t i t a t i v e f igures may be the 
lack of confidence in the assumption underlying risk analysis , a 
cr i t ic ism which i s d i f f icul t to formulate by the general public, 
and which may, therefore, be expressed in terms of risk level . 
One major problem, in analytical r isk assessnent i s to obtain a 
c l ea r and e x p l i c i t formulat ion of the coverage of an a n a l y s i s . 
The f ina l r e s u l t of a r i s k ana lys i s i s a t h e o r e t i c a l cons t ruc t 
which re la tes empirical data describing functional and fa i lure 
p r o p e r t i e s of equipment and processes to a q u a n t i t a t i v e or 
q u a l i t a t i v e s ta tement of the ove ra l l r i sk to be expected from 
the operation of the system. The analysis depends on a decision 
regarding the boundaries of the system to be considered; on a 
model describing the structure of the system and i t s functional 
p r o p e r t i e s in normal and in a l l r e l evan t abnormal modes of 
operation, including the ac t i v i t i e s of the people present in the 
system; together with a number of simplifying assumptions which 
are necessary to f a c i l i t a t e a sys temat ic ana ly s i s . These a s -
sumptions, the model, and the charac ter i s t ics of the sources of 
the empir ical data used, are j u s t as important r e s u l t s of the 
assessment study as is the resul t ing risk figure, since they are 
the necessary precondi t ion for the operat ion of the system in 
correspondence with this risk target . 
Unfortunately, neither this basis of analysis nor the s t ra teg ies 
used to identify the mechanisms and courses of events to include 
i r: the analysis, are generally expl ici t ly formulated in present 
a n a l y t i c a l techniques . This makes i t d i f f i c u l t to use the 
analyse? for control of the actual conditions during operation. 
The conclusion i s that a major problem in presentation of cred-
ible risk analysis i s the formulation of the underlying models 
and assumptions in a way which makes poss ib le an independent 
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v e r i f i c a t i o n of t he co r r e spondence w i t h t h e a c t u a l i n s t a l l a t i o n . 
The a in of t h e p r e s e n t p a p e r i s t o p o i n t t o s e v e r a l a s p e c t s i n 
the t e c h n o l o g i c a l development which a g g r e v a t e t h i s problem and, 
t h e r e f o r e , r e q u i r e more a c t i v e r e s e a r c h e f f o r t s , i n p a r t i c u l a r 
w i t h r e s p e c t t o m o d e l s i n c l u d i n g human a c t i v i t i e s and t h e e f -
f e c t s of nodern i n f o r m a t i o n t e c h n o l o g y . 
NATURE OF HUMAN ERROR 
The t r e n d s d i s c u s s e d in the i n t r o d u c t i o n i n v i t e a c l o s e r look on 
the n a t u r e of human e r r o r s . In t h e i n d u s t r i a l or t e c h n i c a l con -
t e x t , t h e d e f i n i t i o n of a human e r r o r h a s t y p i c a l l y b e e n made i n 
analogy to component f a u l t s . For a n a l y t i c a l r i s k a s s e s s m e n t , a 
t e c h n i c a l i n s t a l l a t i o n h a s b e e n c o n s i d e r e d an a g g r e g a t i o n of 
s t a n d a r d components f o r which f a i l u r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and f r e -
q u e n c i e s c o u l d be d e t e r m i n e d e m p i r i c a l l y from a p p l i c a t i o n i n 
o t h e r s y s t e m s . The o v e r a l l r i s k i n v o l v e d i n sys tem o p e r a t i o n can 
t h e n be c a l c u l a t e d o r s i m u l a t e d by means of a model of t h e 
c a u s a l s t r u c t u r e of t h e s y s t e m . In a n a l o g y , human p e r f o r m a n c e 
was c o n s i d e r e d an a g g r e g a t i o n of s t a n d a r d a c t s o r r o u t i n e s fo r 
which e r r o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and f r e q u e n c i e s cou ld be c o l l e c t e d 
from s i m i l a r a c t i v i t i e s in o t h e r t a s k s e t t i n g s . 
T h i s a p p r o a c h h a s c l o s e l i n k s t o T a y l o r i s m i n i n d u s t r i a l e n -
g i n e e r i n g and behav iou r i sm in psycho logy , and has been f r u i t f u l 
i n a n a l y s i s of s y s t e m s w h e r e human a c t i v i t y h a s b e e n manual 
assembly t a s k s , r e p a i r , and c a l i b r a t i o n . Such t a s k s can o f t e n be 
decomposed i n t o more o r l e s s s e p a r a t e , manual r o u t i n e s , and 
a n a l y s i s can be b a s e d on t h e o v e r t a c t i v i t y wh ich t o a l a r g e 
d e g r e e i s c o n t r o l l e d and s e q u e n c e d by t h e s y s t e m . A n o t h e r i m -
p o r t a n t f e a t u r e i s t h a t many t a s k s have been r e p e t i t i v e , and 
t h a t p e r f o r m e r s have r eached a s t a b l e l e v e l in a s k i l l in which 
e r r o r s can be c o n s i d e r e d s t o c h a s t i c v a r i a t i o n s going beyond the 
l i m i t s a c c e p t a b l e fo r p r o p e r sys tem pe r fo rmance . 
The a p p l i c a t i o n of modern i n f o r m a t i o n t e c h n o l o g y i s r a p i d l y 
changing the b a s i e f o r t h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s . Automation has removed 
many r e p e t i t i v e t a s k s and g iven humans the r o l e of s u p e r v i s o r s 
and t r o u b l e s h o o t e r s . Th is means t h a t t h e i r pe r formance i s more 
r e l a t e d t o d e c i s i o n mak ing and p r o b l e m s o l v i n g a n d , c o n s e -
q u e n t l y , cannot be a d e q u a t e l y decomposed i n t o s t a n d a r d r o u t i n e s 
in t e rms of o v e r t , o b s e r v a b l e e l e m e n t s . A n a l y s i s has n e c e s s a r i l y 
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to be performed in terms of cogni t ive information process ing 
related to diagnosis, goal evaluation, p r io r i t i s i ng , and plan-
ning. Such mental functions are much less cons t ra ined by the 
ex te rna l task condi t ions . They can be solved success fu l ly by 
several d i f f e r en t s t r a t e g i e s and the individual choice w i l l 
depend on very subjective c r i t e r i a . Another important point i s 
tha t performance in a task can no longer be assumed to be a t a 
s t ab l e leve l of t r a i n i n g . Learning and adapta t ion during pe r -
formance v/ill be significant features of many s i tua t ions which 
are r e l evan t for ana lys i s of the u l t ima te r i sk . I t fol lows 
tha t ana lys i s of the human ro le in t h i s r i sk can no longer be 
based on a model of the ex te rna l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the t ask . 
Design has to be r e l a t ed to a model of human performance in 
psychological terms r e f e r r i ng to cogni t ive c a p a b i l i t i e s and 
limi t a t ions . 
Furthermore, when performance can no longer be judged with re fe-
rence tc a stable normal performance, the definit ion of "human 
error" becomes dubious. Considering a highly ski l led performance 
of a task there w i l l genera l ly be no d i f f i c u l t y in i d e n t i f i -
ca t ion of e r r o r s and no dispute between the performer con-
sidering his actual goals and intentions and a posterior analy-
s i s . However, considering performance during complex abnormal 
s i tuat ions which are part of an accidental scenario there i s no 
c l ea r reference for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of ' ' e r rors" . They are found 
during the search for causes of the acc iden ta l event , but the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n in terms of component f a u l t , opera tor e r r o r , 
manufacturing error, or design error depends ent i re ly upon the 
stop-rule applied for termination of the search. This s top-rule 
will be purely pragmatic and be something l ike: An event wil l be 
accepted as a cause and the search terminated i f the causal path 
can be followed no longer, or a f ami l i a r , abnormal event i s 
found which is therefore accepted as explanation, and a cure i s 
known. Paradoxica l ly , human e r r o r s seem to be a l l o c a t e d under 
two typical circumstances. On one hand, human errors are found 
when human var iab i l i ty brings an otherwise stable task outside 
acceptable l i m i t s . On the o ther , human e r r o r s are found v/hen 
human v a r i a b i l i t y or a d a p t a b i l i t y proved i n s u f f i c i e n t to cope 
with v a r i a t i o n s in task content ; if, on h inds igh t , a "reason-
able" human ought to be able to cope with disturbances. 
I t appears to be a more f r u i t f u l approach not to look for e r r o r s 
as causes of accidents, but to consider the related events to be 
occasions of human-task mismatches and to look for factors which 
are sensi t ive tc improvement, whether or not they are considered 
causes, i . e . i r r e s p e c t i v e l y of t h e i r loca t ion on the causal 
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path. Accidents can be avoided by breaking the path, as well as 
by removing causes, as everybody wil l know (Leplat and Rasmus-
sen, 1984). 
The nature of the tasks in modern systems, being r e l a t e d to 
problem solving and decision making in which adaptation to unfa-
mil iar s i tuat ions i s crucia l , makes i t very doubtful whether a 
category of behaviour ca l l ed e r r o r s can be meaningfully main-
tained. The term "error" in a way implies that something could 
be done to the humans in order to improve the s ta te of af fa i rs . 
Recent work on the problem i n d i c a t e s tha t e f f ec t i ve means can 
more r ead i ly be found when consider ing design of " e r r o r - t o l -
erant" systems - by means of modern information technology. 
Basically, system designers have to accept human var iab i l i ty as 
an integral element in human learning and adaptation (Rasmussen, 
1984). Fine- tuning of manual s k i l l s depends upon a continuous 
updating of the sensory-motor schemata to the t ime-space fea-
tures of the task environment. If the optimisation c r i t e r i a are 
speed ond smoothness, adaptation can only be constrained by the 
once-in-a-while experience gained when cross ing the p rec i s ion 
to le rance l i i r i t s , i .e . by the experience of e r r o r s or near-
errors . These, then, have a function in maintaining a sk i l l , and 
they n e i t h e r can nor should be removed. Also at the more con-
sciously controlled rule-following level , development of know-
how and rules-of-thumb i s depending upon a basic va r i ab i l i ty and 
opportunity for experiments to find shortcuts and identify con-
venient and re l iable signs which make i t possible to recognize 
recurrent conditions without analytical diagnosis; in short, to 
develop quasi-rat ional heur i s t i c s . Involved in genuine problem 
solving, t e s t of hypothesis becomes an important need. I t i s 
typically expected that operators check their diagnostic hypo-
thesis conceptually - by thought experiments - before operations 
on the p l an t . This, however, appears to be an u n r e a l i s t i c a s -
sumption, s ince i t may be tempting to t e s t a hypothesis on the 
system i t s e l f in order to avoid the s t r a i n from reasoning in a 
complex causal ne t . For t h i s task , a designer i s supplied with 
effective tools l ike experimental set-ups, simulation programs 
and computational aids, whereas the operator has only his head 
and the plant i t se l f . And - "The best simulation of a cat - is a 
cat ." In t h i s way, ac t s which on af te r thought are judged to be 
mis takes , may very well be reasonable ac t s intended to gain 
information about the actual s ta te of affa i rs . 
In other words, consider ing the human ro le in modern systems, 
human e r r o r s should r a the r be considered to be "unsuccessful 
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experiments in an unfr iendly environment", and design e f f o r t s 
should be spent on friendly, i.e. e r ror - to le ran t , systems. 
The view that "errors" are integral parts of learning mechanisms 
has long roots. Already Ernest Mach (1905) notes: "Knowledge and 
error flows from the same mental sources, only success can t e l l 
the one from the other" , and Selz (1922) found tha t e r r o r s in 
problem solving were not s t ochas t i c even ts , but had to be seen 
as resu l t s of solution t r i a l s with regard to the task, which i s 
somewhat misconceived. Hadamard, the mathematician, s t a t e s 
(1945): "— in our domain, we do not have to ponder with errors . 
Good mathematicians, when they make them, which i s not i n f r e -
quent, soon perceive and cor rec t them. As for me (and mine i s 
the case of n any mathematicians), I make many more of them than 
my s tudents do; only I always cor rec t them so t h a t no t r ace of 
them remains in the f ina l r e s u l t . The reason for tha t i s tha t 
whenever an error has been made, insight - that same sc ien t i f ic 
sens ib i l i ty we have spoken of - warns me that my calculations do 
not look as they ought to". 
This means that human e r r o r s cannot be s tud ied in i s o l a t i o n , 
only as a par t of an ana lys i s of the psychological mechanisms 
controll ing cognitive ac t i v i t i e s in general. Only quite recently 
has research in cognitive psychology again taken up the in te res t 
in such studies (Reason, 1982; Norman, 1980). The findings match 
very well those fouud from ana lys i s of i n d u s t r i a l acc iden ts 
(Rasmussen, 1980), and indicate that the great variety of errors 
can to a large degree be explained as the e f f ec t of a very 
limited number of psychological mechanisms when folded onto the 
variety of the work environment - as Simon (1969) argues: —"man 
i s qui te s imple, complexity of h i s behaviour r e f l e c t s l a rge ly 
the complexity of the environment." 
DESIGN OF ERROR-TOLERANT SYSTEMS 
It follows that system designers have to accept that humans make 
errors a l l the time, and that this i s just the other side of the 
generally successful adaptation of the user 's behaviour to the 
pecu l ia r i t i e s of the system. Or, as Reason has said i t : "Syste-
matic e r r o r and cor rec t performance are two s ides of the same 
coin" (Reason, 1985). The task of the des igner wi l l be to aim 
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for error-tolerant systems, in which errors are observable and 
can be reversed before unacceptable consequences develop. 
This brings the use of advanced information technology in the 
work interface into focus. It is now possible to match the 
interface to the requirements of individual users and their 
immediate tasks. From a risk point of view this may lead to 
problems, considering the importance of certain categories of 
rare events for the safety of many kinds of systems. Optimising 
an interface to the requirements of the more frequent members of 
the task repertoire for which performance can be evaluated 
empirically may create difficulties in more unfamiliar task 
situations. Furthermore, optimising for support of task ex-
ecution may violate requirements from error recovery. 
Task execution is based on procedural information of the form: 
If (situation, cue), then do (action, task). For familiar tasks, 
this information is immediately available in terms of skilled 
users* know-how, and computer support of the less skilled can be 
developed in computerised procedure retrieval systems or, in 
more recent terms: expert systems. For monitoring the effect of 
the activity, and for recovery from disturbances, quite a dif-
ferent kind of information is needed. Error detection is not 
simply a question of monitoring the outcome in comparison with 
the goal. In many cases this will lead to detection far too late 
- you cannot save the cake when tasting the final result. Moni-
toring depends on the equivalent of Hadamard's "scientific sen-
sibility" which is something like understanding of the func-
tioning of the system behind the task and knowledge of the 
intended dynamic behaviour. It is important to understand and to 
monitor the process, not only the product. Of major concern from 
a risk point of view, when attempts are made to transfer the 
heuristic rules of "know-how" of human experts to "expert sys-
tems", should be the problems in transferring also the "sensi-
bility" to the limits of expertise. The applicability of 
"expert systems" in centralised systems very much depends on the 
ability to appeal to analytical performance when the precon-
ditions for heuristical rules break down (Barnett, 1982). 
In other words, monitoring of routine activities probably de-
pends on the same kind of information as diagnosis and inter-
vention during infrequent tasks: ability to predict the be-
haviour of the system and to compare with the intended perform-
ance. This additional need should be carefully considered in the 
design of interface systems. 
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CAUSES AND REASONS 
D e c i s i o n making i s i n g e n e r a l a k i n d of r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n i n a 
p r o b l e m s p a c e wh ich can be o r g a n i s e d i n a m e a n s - e n d h i e r a r c h y 
r e f l e c t i n g t he f a c t t h a t t he sys tem i n v o l v e d can be d e s c r i b e d a t 
s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s o f a b s t r a c t i o n i n t h e m a p p i n g of t h e 
p u r p o s e / f u n c t i o n / e q u i p m e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s . A d e c i s i o n t a s k i n v o l -
ves t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of d i s c r e p a n c i e s be tween the a c t u a l s t a t e 
of a f f a i r s and t h e t a r g e t s t a t e s , w h i c h may be done a t any of 
t h e l e v e l s i n t h e m e a n s - e n d h i e r a r c h y . I n t h i s h i e r a r c h y , t h e 
e f f e c t s o f c h a n g e s i n t h e p h y s i c a l w o r l d p r o p a g a t e b o t t o m - u p , 
and t h e r e a s o n s f o r p r o p e r f u n c t i o n s a r e d e r i v e d t o p - d o w n . I n 
t he d e s i g n of i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m s , emphas i s i s t y p i c a l l y p l a c e d 
on r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of f a c t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n from measurements and 
s t a t i s t i c s , i . e . b o t t o m - u p d a t a . T h i s i s due t o an a s s u m p t i o n 
t h a t d e c i s i o n making f o r s u p e r v i s o r y p l a n t c o n t r o l a s w e l l a s 
e x e c u t i v e management depends on r a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s of t he sys tem 
invo lved and i s per formed i n acco rdance w i t h t h e f o r m a l , t h e o r -
e t i c a l d e c i s i o n models . The i n f o r m a t i o n abou t p u r p o s e s , r e a s o n s 
and p o l i c i e s i s only i m p l i c i t l y f o r m u l a t e d ; i t i s assumed to be 
a v a i l a b l e from g e n e r a l t r a i n i n g and i n s t r u c t i o n . Th i s may be t he 
case f o r u n d i s t u r b e d r o u t i n e t a s k s , b u t fo r i n f r e q u e n t t a s k s and 
f o r e r r o r d e t e c t i o n i t i s not n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e . When i n t r o d u c i n g 
i n f o r m a t i o n s y s t e m s a s an i n t e r f a c e t o t h e t a s k c o n t e n t , t h e 
d i s t u r b a n c e of i n f o r m a l t o p - d o w n p a t h s f o r c o m m u n i c a t i o n of 
r e a s o n s should be c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d . 
A d e c i s i o n making t a s k which has been in t h e focus of d i s c u s s i o n 
d u r i n g the r e c e n t decade has been t h a t of i n d u s t r i a l o p e r a t o r s 
d u r i n g s y s t e m f a i l u r e s . I n i n d u s t r i a l p r o c e s s p l a n t c o n t r o l 
r o o m s , a l a r g e amount of m e a s u r e d p l a n t s t a t u s d a t a a r e p r e -
s e n t e d t o the o p e r a t o r s and g r e a t e f f o r t i s s p e n t on development 
of p r o p e r p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n and s u p p o r t of t h e 
o p e r a t o r s i n d i a g n o s i s , i . e . b o t t o m - u p i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e 
a c t u a l p h y s i c a l s t a t e of t he p l a n t . In a d d i t i o n , s u p p o r t of t h e 
o p e r a t o r s ' memory of t he f u n c t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of p l a n t i s g iven 
i n t e r m s of mimic d i a g r a m s , e t c . O p e r a t o r s a r e g e n e r a l l y s u p -
posed to a s s e s s the o p e r a t i o n of the sys tem from u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
of t he f u n c t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e and knowledge of p h y s i c a l v a r i a b l e s . 
T h i s i s f r e q u e n t l y n o t t h e c a s e . Many s y s t e m s , f o r i n s t a n c e 
c o n t r o l s y s t e m s , a r e too complex and o p e r a t o r s w i l l r a t h e r t r y 
t o judge c o r r e c t n e s s of f u n c t i o n w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e i r p e r c e p -
t i o n of t h e d e s i g n e r ' s i n t e n t i o n s , i . e . f rom i n f o r m a t i o n d e -
r i v e d top-down in the h i e r a r c h y . 
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At present, data bases for indus t r ia l control rooms include only 
l i t t l e informat ion about the complex r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
overall purposes and goals and the intent ions behind the design 
at the lov/er l e v e l s of funct ions and equipment. This i s so, 
par t ly because such information i s d i f f i cu l t to formalise, but 
a l so because i t i s only i m p l i c i t l y presen t in tht- form of 
company pol ic ies , design pract ices , and system designers' sub-
j e c t i v e preferences which do not find t h e i r way in to drawings 
and t echn ica l manuals. Ins tead , r e l i a n c e has been on ad hoc 
advice f a c i l i t i e s , e.g. supervisors on c a l l , communication vvith 
des igne r s , e t c . In the nuc lea r indus t ry , g rea t e f fo r t has been 
spent in formalising such systems in terms of "resident techni-
cal advisors", "technical support centers", data links to design 
teams and a u t h o r i t i e s . There i s , however, a movement towards 
exploi ta t ion of advanced information systems, "expert systems", 
for such advice giving, and direct transmission of plant s ta tus 
da ta to ou ts ide adv i so r s by data l i n k s i s considered. At the 
same t ime, there i s a tendency towards an i n t e g r a t i o n of the 
process computer systems and the computer systems used for 
production and maintenance planning. This integration of plant 
control and executive decision making may have implications for 
r i s k management, i f based on a conception of dec i s ions t r a n s -
ferred from normative theories . 
NORMATIVE MODELS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In genera l , the re i s a discrepancy between the normative 
t h e o r i e s for management dec is ion making which are t y p i c a l l y 
derived from economics, and the empirical evidence. I t i s gen-
era l ly assumed that the decisions of high level executives are 
based on careful analysis of s t a t i s t i c s and factual reports , the 
kind of information which i s normally considered for com-
puterised management data bases. Several s tudies indicate that 
t h i s i s an u n r e l i a b l e assumption. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980) 
find that the normative, theoret ic models of decision making are 
only r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the behaviour of novices , and Minzberg 
(1973) concludes from a study that top level executives prefer 
face-to-face interact ion and even hearsay and gossip to analysis; 
of factual reports . A reasonable explanation may be that manage-
ment executives are not faced with a causal system, the response 
of which can be p r ed i c t ed bottom-up by f ac tua l a n a l y s i s . They 
are ac to r s in a soc i a l game and p r e d i c t i o n s have to consider 
- 16 -
intentions and motives of other people rather than objective 
facts. Predictions have to be derived top-down from a reliable 
perception of other people's value structures, for which face 
expressions and gossip may be more reliable sources than stat-
istical reports. 
Communication of values and intention is not only required for 
strategical planning. It is a precondition for the error cor-
rection features which seem to be inherent in social organisa-
tions. Cyert and March (1963) call it "bias discount". When 
people are making frequent errors, one could fear that errors 
would propagate willingly in a social system and add up until a 
major mistake i s at hand. However, this appears not to be the 
case. The individual agents are correcting faults in messages 
and data and will complete ambiguous orders and instructions 
from their implicit knowledge about policies and other people's 
intentions and goals. 
Therefore, failure-tolerant management systems basically depend 
on the continuous and efficient communication of corporate and 
individual values and intentions. One of the major risk problems 
related to the introduction of information technology in centra-
lised systems may therefore be the temptation of rational, 
scientifically minded experts to design large systems in which 
centralised data banks with factual information are the basis 
for communication between decision makers, and, unwillingly, 
disturb the communication of values and intentions which is 
necessary for error recovery. 
There may, however, be another dimension to the communication of 
value structures. Such communication is crucial for error re-
covery but may lead to a very tightly coupled system with short 
time constant and, consequently, stability problems. Losses and 
time delays are fundamental tools for maintaining stability in 
technical systems. Are sirrilar measures now necessary in social 
systems? The consequences of effective communication of atti-
tudes and values can be seen at a grand scale, as a consequence 
of the effective communication of values by the mass media. It 
took the French revolution half a decade to initiate a change in 
Denmark, where a new constitution was the result of a meeting. 
The student revolt in Berkely was, however, followed next 
morning jn Copenhagen. Small-scale experiments and adjustment of 
approaches at a reversible level may be difficult in tightly 
coupled, fast systems. Is it now necessary to consider stability 
theory of social systems on a control theoretic basis? If so, 
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approaches l i ke F o r r e s t e r ' s (1971) modelling should be sup-
plemented with models of propagation of values. 
ADVICE ACCEPTANCE 
Closely connected to th i s r e l i a b i l i t y problem i s the problem of 
advice acceptabi l i ty . When several people cooperate in decision 
making, they wil l be exchanging messages communicating factual 
information, r e su l t s of analysis, and plans for action. The form 
of the messages may vary, depending upon the role of the p a r t i -
cipants and upon the i r authority. For data, the form ranges from 
s ta tements of f a c t s to hypotheses of varying l i ke l ihood , and 
plans for a c t i ons may be s t a t ed as p roposa l s , advices , i n -
s t r u c t i o n s , or o rde r s . I t i s c ruc i a l for the r e l i a b i l i t y of 
cooperat ive dec is ion making tha t messages are received in the 
mode they were intended by the sender, e.g. the designer of a 
computer-based decision support system. For orders, th i s i s no 
grea t problem, but the quest ion of c r i t e r i a for proper under-
standing and acceptance of advice and recommendations i s c ru -
c i a l . What kind of information i s needed for making an advisee 
understand an advice properly? The problem has been discussed in 
some d e t a i l for "expert systems" for support of medical d i ag -
nos is l ike MYCIN (see for ins tance S h o r t l i f f e , 1983), but the 
solution proposed, which is a replay of the inference rules used 
by the advisor, does not appear to be convincing. Understanding 
of a piece of advice depends not only on a step-by-step tracing 
of the way in which the r e s u l t was found, but a l so on reasons 
why that path was chosen. I t i s important to consider that human 
decis ion makers are q u a s i - r a t i o n a l ; underlying a n a l y t i c a l 
reasoning the re i s a background of i n t u i t i v e judgement and 
expectations. The composition of in tu i t ion and analysis depends 
e n t i r e l y on the f a m i l i a r i t y of the problem context to the de-
cision maker and, consequently, so does the kind of information 
required to make advice understood. 
The interact ion between user, computer, and designer changes in 
a very important way when the rou t ine tasks are automated and 
only the ad hoc, on - l ine decis ion making is l e f t as an i n t e r -
ac t ive task . For frequent t a sks , a "task a l l o c a t i o n " can be 
made. From empir ica l evidence the human w i l l have d e f i n i t e 
expec ta t ions about the automated funct ions and i n t u i t i v e l y be 
able to "understand" them. He will not need conscicus, ana ly t i -
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c a l e v a l u a t i o n of the a u t o m a t i c f u n c t i o n s , he w i l l be a l l o w e d to 
f o r g e t d e t a i l s , r e a s o n s , and n e c e s s a r y p r e c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s i s 
no t t he c a s e f o r i n t e r a c t i v e d e c i s i o n making where t he computer 
i s supposed to t a k e over the d a t a c o l l e c t i o n , p r e p r o c e s s i n g , and 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n d u r i n g v a r i o u s p h a s e s o f t h e d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . 
The human u s e r i s t h e n s u p p o s e d t o a c c e p t t h e r e s u l t from t h e 
computer and t o t a k e over i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g d u r i n g p a r t i c u -
l a r - a r d f r e q u e n t l y b a d l y s t r u c t u r e d - p a r t s of t h e d e c i s i o n 
p r o c e s s . Th is p r e s u p p o s e s , however , t h a t t he human a c c e p t s the 
immedia te r e s u l t s of t he computer , and t h i s i n a s i t u a t i o n when 
t h e human may h a v e no i n t u i t i o n and no w e l l s t r u c t u r e d e x p e c -
t a t i o n s t o t h e m e s s a g e . The u s e r w i l l need t o e v a l u a t e t h e 
r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e message i n some way and w i l l need an e x p l a -
n a t i o n w h i c h i s n o t j u s t a r e p l a y of t h e a l g o r i t h m , b u t i n f o r -
m a t i o n m a t c h i n g t h e u s e r ' s i n t u i t i v e e x p e c t a t i o n s . I f t h i s i s 
n o t p o s s i b l e , a mode of c o m p e t i t i v e r a t h e r t h a n c o o p e r a t i v e 
i n t e r a c t i o n may d e v e l o p . In such s y s t e m s , d e s i g n i s no t a q u e s -
t i o n of t a s k a l l o c a t i o n , r a t h e r a q u e s t i o n of a l l o c a t i o n of 
a u t h o r i t y ; t h e t a s k i s p e r f o r m e d more o r l e s s i n p a r a l l e l by t h e 
u s e r , the compute r , and the programmer. What i s s h i f t i n g i s t he 
r o l e a s p e r f o r m e r , m o n i t o r , and a d v i s o r , and , w i t h t h a t , t h e 
mode of p r o c e s s i n g a p p l i e d . 
ETHICAL QUESTIONS OF DESIGN 
The d i f f i c u l t y i n h i g h l y a u t o m a t e d s y s t e m s of e s t a b l i s h i n g a 
c l e a r r e f e r e n c e i n t e r m s of "normal b e h a v i o u r " r a i s e s some p r o -
blems f o r d e s i g n e r s of l a r g e - s c a l e sy s t ems in t e rms of c o m p a t i -
b i l i t y between t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s t o u s e r b e h a v i o u r , t h e a c t u a l 
b e h a v i o u r , and a p o s t e r i o r j u d g e m e n t of b e h a v i o u r i n c a s e of 
a c c i d e n t s . The a l l o c a t i o n of g u i l t a f t e r t h e f a c t d e p e n d s on a 
c o n c e p t of a " r e a s o n a l p e r s o n " w h i c h may be v e r y d i f f e r e n t f o r 
b e h a v i o u r i n v e r y f a m i l i a r s i t u a t i o n s and i n c a s e of p r o b l e m 
s o l v i n g d u r i n g d i s t u r b e d s i t u a t i o n s . Th is " r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n " a t 
t i m e s seems to be r a t h e r s i m i l a r t o t h e n o r m a t i v e d e c i s i o n t h e o -
r i s t ' s " r a t i o n a l a g e n t " , and an i n t e r a c t i o n among p r o f e s s i o n a l s 
from s y s t e m s d e s i g n , p s y c h o l o g y , s o c i o l o g y , and l e g a l m a t t e r s 
mj£ht be u s e f u l t o probe t he need f o r changes in the p e r c e p t i o n 
of human e r r o r s . 
- 19 -
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion of this discussion will be that the present rapid 
technologica l development, in p a r t i c u l a r wi thin information 
technologies , makes i t i nc reas ing ly important to r e a l i s e tha t 
conditions for systems design have changed. Up to now, systems 
design and planning of human work condi t ions have been con-
sidered two independent a c t i v i t i e s on each side of a man-machine 
interface which is taken care of by human factors spec ia l i s t s . 
I t i s symptomatic tha t the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Federat ions of Auto-
matic Control (IFAC) and Information Processing (IFIP) have had 
two committees. One on "Social Effects of Automation" taking 
care of systems considered as the work environment of humans, 
and another on "Modelling Man-Machine Interaction" considering 
humans as funct ional systems components. A consequence of the 
t ight coupling of the a c t i v i t i e s of humans and computers at the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l level w i l l be t ha t t h i s separa t ion i s no longer 
p o s s i b l e . Human values and a t t i t u d e s w i l l not only be a ques-
t ion of q u a l i t y of working l i f e , but d i r e c t l y inf luence func-
t ional effectiveness and r e l i a b i l i t y . I t also means that proper 
design i s no longer a question of having prac t i t ioners in Human 
Factors to use the available resu l t s from academic research; no 
acceptable design model cf higher level in te l l ec tua l processes 
and of a f f e c t i v e s t a t e s i s as yet a v a i l a b l e , and a change in 
academic research i s needed towards ana ly s i s of complex man-
machine systems in cognitive psychology, l ingu i s t i c s , semiotics, 
e tc . Furthermore, i t wil l be mandatory that researchers within 
these f ie lds have a solid basis in technological knowledge and 
understanding. As the sociologist Peter Winch (1958) noticed:"A 
sociologist of rel igion must himself have some rel igious feeling 
i f he i s to make sense of the rel igious movement he i s studying 
and understand the considerations which govern the l ives of i t s 
par t ic ipants" . I t wi l l , in the same way, be impossible to study 
human i n t e r a c t i o n with t echn ica l systems without fundamental 
knowledge of the technology. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y so for the 
design of high risk man-machine systems. 
There a re , f o r tuna t e ly , severa l s igns of changes in the proper 
d i r e c t i o n . Univers i ty f a c u l t i e s are d i scuss ing the plans for 
technical-humanistic l ines of education, and programs for psy-
chological experiments in complex decision making s i tua t ions are 
taking over in te res t from the c lass ical experimental psychology 
paradigm. Also, committees like those of IFAC/IFIP are mutually 
trying to reach an integrated view of the c r i t e r i a for systems 
design. 
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